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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff/Appellant Yusef Steele was a pretrial detainee 
housed at the Middlesex County Adult Correction Center 
(“MCACC”) in New Jersey in late 2008 and early 2009.  
During the course of his detention at MCACC, officials at the 
facility received credible information that Steele was involved 
in a scheme with an outside bail bonds service, Speedy Bail 
Bonds.  Officials believed that Steele was threatening other 
detainees in order to coerce them into using Speedy and that 
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Steele was receiving some form of compensation from 
Speedy for his efforts.  After interviewing Steele and advising 
him of the allegations against him, officials placed him in 
administrative segregation while they continued to investigate 
his conduct.  During his time in segregation, Steele’s 
telephone privileges were restricted to legal calls only.   
 
 Steele claims in this Section 1983 suit that the 
Defendant/Appellee MCACC officials violated his due 
process rights when they transferred him to administrative 
segregation in the facility and restricted his phone privileges, 
which interfered with his ability to attempt to find a co-signer 
for his own bail.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for all Defendants.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 
On December 22, 2008, Steele was arrested for 
violating a narcotics restraining order.  He was then placed 
into pretrial detention at MCACC.  The next day, Steele’s bail 
was set at $50,000, which he was unable to pay.   
 
On February 23, 2009, while Steele remained in 
detention at MCACC, Robert Gluck, a private attorney, 
contacted MCACC Deputy Warden Masone about safety 
concerns Gluck had for his client, another MCACC detainee.  
According to Gluck, Steele approached Gluck’s client and 
threatened to disclose his client’s sex offense charges to 
MCACC’s general population if Gluck’s client did not use a 
                                              
 1 The parties have not disputed the facts outlined 
herein, unless otherwise noted. 
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specific bail bonds service, Speedy Bail Bonds.  Gluck 
reported that Steele handed his client a document that listed 
his client’s charges and bail amount.  Gluck also faxed to 
Masone a copy of the document.   
 
After obtaining this information from Gluck, Masone 
and Sergeant Paul De Amicis began an investigation of Steele 
and Speedy’s activities within MCACC.  They interviewed 
Gluck’s client, who confirmed that Steele threatened him and 
provided him with a specific phone number to use to arrange 
his bail.  Masone and De Amicis confirmed that the phone 
number belonged to a Speedy office.  
  
De Amicis continued the investigation by reviewing 
recorded phone calls from the unit in which Steele was 
housed.  He found numerous calls between Steele and 
Speedy, during which Steele referenced detainees’ names, 
identification numbers, and the specific amounts of their 
bails.  According to De Amicis, Steele bragged in some of 
those phone conversations about “his ability to get other 
inmates to post bail using Speedy” and Steele “referred to 
credit he expected to receive for bails he recruited for 
Speedy.”  App. 1312.  Based on the results of the preliminary 
investigation, MCACC officials believed that Steele “was 
acting as an illegal agent for Speedy” and that he was 
receiving some type of compensation from Speedy in 
exchange for his efforts to arrange detainees’ bails.  App. 
1312. 
 
 MCACC officials met with Steele on February 25, 
2009, just two days after Gluck’s call, to discuss the 
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allegations.2  During the meeting, MCACC officials apprised 
Steele of a complaint they received that he had been “making 
money for the bail bondsmen,” “threatening inmates,” and 
“trying to get money out of [them].”  App. 1303.  Officials 
asked Steele to explain his actions with Speedy and permitted 
him to respond to their questions.  Steele admitted to helping 
other detainees arrange bails, but denied that he was receiving 
any compensation from Speedy.  Steele stated that he was 
arranging detainees’ bails with Speedy “out of the goodness 
of [his] heart.”  App. 1305.  As officials were meeting with 
Steele on February 25th, MCACC corrections officers 
searched Steele’s cell and found materials that corroborated 
the allegations against him.  These materials included lists of 
detainees’ names, bail amounts, and phone numbers of 
detainees’ friends and relatives.  
  
That same day, Steele was transferred to 
administrative segregation.3  De Amicis averred that Steele 
was placed in administrative segregation in order “to prevent 
                                              
2 Sergeant De Amicis stated that the officials who 
attended the meeting were Warden Cicchi, Deputy Warden 
Masone, and De Amicis.  According to Steele’s complaint, 
Masone, Defendant Captain Barth, and probably De Amicis 
attended the meeting.  During his deposition, Steele stated 
that Barth and Masone were the MCACC officials who 
attended the February 25th meeting.  
  
3 On February 26, 2009, MCACC provided Steele with 
a letter confirming his transfer to administrative segregation, 
which noted that the Classification Committee would review 
Steele’s status on a monthly basis.   
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him from posing additional security risks in the [MCACC] 
and to allow further investigation into Speedy’s activities 
without [Steele’s] interference.”  App. 1313.  Later in the day 
on February 25th, Masone and De Amicis met with 
employees of Speedy, who confirmed that Steele was an 
“associate” who was recruiting other detainees to use Speedy 
for their bail bonds.  App. 1313.  After further investigation, 
MCACC officials contacted the county prosecutor’s office 
and the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance.   
 
The MCACC “Inmate Guidelines” manual (“the 
Manual”), which served as a guide for inmate conduct and jail 
procedures, contained a number of provisions addressing 
telephone access at the facility.  It provided that individuals 
housed in the general population had open access to collect 
call telephones for personal calls and were allowed an 
unlimited number of legal calls.  It also provided that 
individuals placed in “disciplinary lockup” were not 
permitted telephone access, with the exception of legal 
telephone calls.  App. 1345.  The Manual did not address 
telephone access for detainees housed in administrative 
segregation.4  While he remained in administrative 
segregation, Steele was permitted only to make legal calls, 
through the MCACC social work office.   
                                              
 4 The New Jersey Department of Corrections’ 1999 
“Handbook for Discipline for Inmates” was appended to the 
Manual.  The Handbook addressed telephone access for 
inmates placed in Administrative Segregation.  However, the 
Handbook stated that it applied only to state-sentenced 
inmates.  Steele has not argued on appeal that the Handbook 
applied to him; his arguments center on the MCACC’s own 
internal Manual. 
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On March 5, 2009, Steele’s bail was reduced from 
$50,000 to $2,500.  Thereafter, Steele made three attempts to 
contact his attorney to help him obtain a co-signer for his bail.  
Steele reached the attorney’s secretary twice, and made 
contact with his lawyer on his third attempt.  On March 20, 
2009, Steele’s bail was posted and he was released.  
  
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Steele originally filed this action pro se in July 2009 in 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey.  The operative Amended Complaint was filed pro se 
in May 2012.  In his Amended Complaint, Steele asserted 
several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: violations of his First, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.   
 
In December 2013, after five rounds of summary 
judgment motions, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Defendants as to Steele’s First and Eighth 
Amendment claims.  The Court denied summary judgment as 
to Steele’s claims under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but permitted Defendants to move 
for summary judgment again on those claims in January 
2014.  In May 2014, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to all Defendants on Steele’s Fourteenth 
Amendment claims, holding that they did not violate Steele’s 
rights under the substantive and procedural components of the 
Due Process Clause.  Steele filed this timely appeal.5   
 
                                              
 5 This Court granted Steele appointment of counsel for 
his appeal.  He does not challenge the District Court’s 
disposition of his First and Eighth Amendment claims. 
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III.  JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this Section 
1983 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving 
party carries its burden to establish that “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “We 
review an award of summary judgment de novo, applying the 
same test on review that the District Court should have 
applied.”  MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 
204, 209 (3d Cir. 2005).  That is, we review “the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all 
inferences in that party’s favor.”  Burns v. PA Dep’t of Corr., 
642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Armbruster v. 
Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
  
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, and contains both substantive and procedural 
components, Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-
46 (1998).  Steele claims that Defendants violated both 
components, which we address in turn below.  
 
A.  Substantive Due Process 
 “The substantive component of the Due Process 
Clause limits what government may do regardless of the 
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fairness of procedures that it employs,” Boyanowski v. 
Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
2000), in order to “guarantee protect[ion] against government 
power arbitrarily and oppressively exercised,” Lewis, 523 
U.S. at 846 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 
(1986)).  To maintain a substantive due process claim, Steele 
must have been deprived of a particular interest that “is 
protected by the substantive due process clause.”  Chainey v. 
Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008).  
 
 Steele claims that Defendants’ actions infringed on 
four separate liberty interests.  First, he asserts that 
Defendants interfered with his “constitutionally-protected 
liberty interest” in “posting bail once his bail was set.”6  Br. 
of Appellant 16 (capitalization omitted).  Second, Steele 
argues that by placing him in administrative segregation, 
Defendants interfered with his constitutional liberty interest in 
avoiding punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt.  Third, 
Steele contends that Defendants interfered with his “state-
created liberty interest[]” in accessing the telephones at 
MCACC, an interest that Steele argues was created by the 
MCACC Manual.  Br. of Appellant 24.  Fourth, Steele argues 
that his administrative segregation violated his “state-created 
liberty interest in remaining part of the general prison 
population.”  Suppl. Br. of Appellant 1-2. 
  
 As an initial matter, Steele cannot proceed on his third 
and fourth claimed liberty interests, because substantive due 
                                              
 6 To be clear, Steele claims a liberty interest in 
exercising his bail option using funds already available to 
him.  His claim does not touch on issues relating to the 
amount of his bail or his ability to pay.   
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process claims do not arise out of state-created liberty 
interests.  In contrast to procedural due process rights, which 
may be derived from state law, “[s]ubstantive due process 
rights are founded not upon state law but upon deeply rooted 
notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the 
Constitution.”  Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th 
Cir. 1999)); see also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 
U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that 
procedural due process protects certain interests even though 
those interests are “derived from state law rather than the 
Constitution,” but “substantive due process rights are created 
only by the Constitution”).  Therefore, as we examine 
Steele’s substantive due process claims here, we consider 
only Steele’s two claimed constitutionally protected liberty 
interests, which are themselves interrelated.  These are: (1) 
exercising his bail option once his bail was set, and (2) 
remaining free from punishment before an adjudication of 
guilt.7 
 
1. Exercising bail option 
 There is no dispute between the parties that Steele had 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in exercising his 
                                              
 7 The District Court addressed Steele’s allegations 
regarding bail access only insofar as they related to the 
question of whether his transfer to administrative  
segregation amounted to unconstitutional punishment.  
Because we understand Steele to advance these as two 
factually intertwined but legally independent substantive due  
process claims, we will address each separately. 
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bail option, once bail had been set, sufficient to trigger 
substantive due process protection.  We agree.  Such a right 
emanates from the liberties “at the heart” of the Due Process 
Clause: the freedom “from government custody, detention, or 
other forms of physical restraint” prior to any determination 
of guilt.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); see 
also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom 
from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary 
governmental action.”).  The Supreme Court has explained 
that an arrestee’s right to freedom from pretrial detention is 
subordinated to other interests only in specific circumstances 
– particularly where there has been an adjudication that 
detention is necessary because an “arrestee presents an 
identified and articulable threat to an individual or the 
community,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 
(1987), or to “ensure [an arrestee’s] presence at trial,” Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979).  But those circumstances 
do not exist in a case like this one, where there has already 
been a judicial determination that an arrestee is eligible for 
release on bail and bail has been set for that arrestee.   
 
 Other Circuits acknowledge that substantive due 
process protection of this liberty interest attaches once 
arrestees are deemed eligible for release on bail.  For 
instance, in Dodds v. Richardson, the Tenth Circuit explained 
that “an arrestee obtains a liberty interest in being freed of 
detention once his bail is set because the setting of bail 
accepts the security of the bond for the arrestee’s appearance 
at trial.”  614 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010).  Likewise, 
the Eleventh Circuit held in Campbell v. Johnson that “[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause includes the right 
to be free from continued detention after it was or should 
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have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.”  
586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, we conclude that Steele had a 
protected liberty interest in exercising his bail option once his 
bail was set.  
  
 Having established that his asserted liberty interest is 
protected by substantive due process, Steele must also show 
that “the government’s deprivation of that protected interest 
shocks the conscience.”  Chainey, 523 F.3d at 219.  The 
Supreme Court has instructed that we must apply the “shocks 
the conscience” standard where, as here, the challenged 
government action is executive in nature rather than 
legislative.8  See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845-47.  “[T]he exact 
degree of wrongfulness necessary to reach the ‘conscience-
shocking’ level” will “depend[] upon the circumstances of a 
particular case,” and may range from “deliberate 
indifference” to “actual intent to cause harm.”  Vargas v. City 
of Phila., 783 F.3d 962, 973 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  We cannot say that Defendants’ actions here 
amount to even deliberate indifference.   
 
 MCACC officials permitted Steele, during his time in 
administrative segregation, to make calls to his attorney to 
arrange for bail.  Indeed, Steele made three such phone calls 
to his attorney’s office, through the MCACC social work 
                                              
 8 Where the government infringes on a plaintiff’s right 
through legislative activity, by contrast, the Supreme Court 
has explained that we must determine whether the legislation 
at issue is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997). 
 14 
 
office, beginning the day after Steele’s bail was reduced from 
$50,000 to $2,500.  Steele offered no evidence that MCACC 
staff prevented or inhibited him from attempting to contact 
his attorney via phone.  Steele also offered nothing to suggest 
that his attorney was ill-equipped to assist Steele with 
arranging bail.  In addition, Steele’s access to mail was not 
restricted during his time in segregation.  In short, though 
MCACC officials curtailed Steele’s unlimited, non-legal 
phone privileges during his administrative segregation, 
officials preserved two key channels of communication 
through which Steele could attempt to secure his bail while in 
segregation. 
  
 Steele’s circumstances are distinguishable from the 
arrestees’ circumstances in Dodds and Campbell.  In Dodds, 
after a judge set the plaintiff-arrestee’s bond, two individuals 
asked employees at the jail where the plaintiff was housed 
about posting bond on the plaintiff’s behalf.  Dodds, 614 F.3d 
at 1189-90.  Those individuals were told in response by jail 
employees that bond would not be accepted before the 
plaintiff was arraigned by a judge, consistent with local 
policies.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit concluded that evidence 
showing the defendants’ policies “prevented felony arrestees 
whose bail had been set from posting bail after hours and 
before arraignment” was sufficient to overcome summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s due process claim.  Id. at 1206 
(emphasis added). 
   
 In Campbell, jail administrators refused to accept 
court-approved real estate documents as security for the 
plaintiff-arrestee’s bail for months after his bail was set.  
Campbell, 586 F.3d at 838-39.  The Eleventh Circuit found 
this evidence sufficient to overcome summary judgment on 
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the plaintiff’s due process claim.  Id. at 840-42; see also 
Gaylor v. Does, 105 F.3d 572 (10th Cir. 1997) (reversing 
grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff-
arrestee’s due process claim, where bail was set but was never 
communicated to the plaintiff or other individuals inquiring 
about it).  Officials’ actions in Dodds and Campbell 
unreasonably inhibited, and essentially prevented, the 
plaintiffs from exercising their bail options after bail was set.  
On the record before us, we cannot say that MCACC officials 
put Steele in the same predicament.  
  
At bottom, we cannot agree with Steele’s argument 
that in the specific circumstances of this case substantive due 
process required Defendants to provide Steele with unlimited, 
non-legal telephone privileges during his time in 
administrative segregation so that he could attempt to find a 
co-signer for his bail and exercise his bail option.9  
                                              
 9 Precedent addressing various constitutional 
protections of telephone access in detention settings informs 
and is consistent with our decision here.  See, e.g., Valdez v. 
Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1042-43, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(restricting telephone access of detainee placed in 
administrative segregation to one legal telephone call per day 
did not violate plaintiff’s substantive due process rights); 
Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(explaining that inmates do not have a constitutional right to 
unlimited telephone use); Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 
1108 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that inmates do not have a right 
to unlimited telephone use, and telephone communication 
with relatives and friends may be restricted “in a reasonable 
manner”); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1458 (7th Cir. 
1988) (holding that it did not violate the Due Process Clause 
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Defendants’ limitation of Steele’s phone privileges did not 
“shock the conscience,” and therefore, Steele’s claim that 
Defendants violated his due process right to exercise his bail 
option fails.10   
                                                                                                     
to limit pretrial detainees’ non-legal calls); Strandberg v. City 
of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
detainees’ and inmates’ constitutional right to telephone 
access is “subject to rational limitations in the face of 
legitimate security interests of the penal institution” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 
10 In their briefing, the parties apply the Bell v. Wolfish 
“punishment” framework, discussed in greater detail in 
Section IV(A)(2), infra, to Steele’s bail claim.  The District 
Court also applied the Bell framework to Steele’s claims in its 
summary judgment opinion.  But we do not find Bell to be 
squarely applicable to Steele’s claim.   
 
 The Supreme Court in Bell explained that it was not 
addressing “the curtailment of liberty” resulting from the 
“decision to detain an accused.”  441 U.S. at 533-34, 541.  
Rather, the Court was addressing specific conditions of 
pretrial confinement, such as double-bunking of detainees, 
which were “aspect[s] of pretrial detention” that did not 
violate other constitutional guarantees.  Id.  In this Circuit, we 
have applied Bell to address a range of conditions of pretrial 
detention, such as strip searches, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 
2010); triple-celling, Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229 (3d 
Cir. 2008); and placement in isolation, Stevenson v. Carroll, 
495 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2007).  Other Circuits similarly have 
applied Bell to address conditions such as strip searches, Byrd 
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2.  Freedom from punishment 
 Steele also claims that his placement in administrative 
segregation violated his substantive due process right to be 
free from punishment.  Under the analytical framework 
established in Bell, detention officials’ restrictions on pretrial 
detainees will constitute punishment prohibited by the Due 
Process Clause when: (1) “there is a showing of express 
intent to punish on the part of [those] [] officials”; (2) “the 
restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate 
non-punitive government purpose,” i.e., “if it is arbitrary or 
purposeless”; or (3) “the restriction is excessive in light of 
that purpose.”  Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 67-68 (quoting Rapier, 
172 F.3d at 1005).  Of these three possible means to establish 
punishment, Steele asserts only the second and third; he has 
not argued in his briefing that such an intent to punish was 
express in nature.   
                                                                                                     
v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 
2011); and solitary confinement, Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 
999 (7th Cir. 1999).   
 
 Steele’s bail claim, however, challenges more than 
conditions of his pretrial detention.  He challenges the 
curtailment of a separate and independent liberty interest that 
arose from his pretrial detention: his right to be freed from 
that detention, by exercising his bail option, once his bail was 
set.  This claim fits awkwardly into the Bell framework, and 
more comfortably into the general “shocks the conscience” 
substantive due process framework applicable to executive 
actions.  Nevertheless, for many of the same reasons provided 
in Section IV(A)(2), infra, Steele’s bail claim would fare no 
better under Bell. 
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 The term “punishment” in this context warrants further 
explanation.  “Punishment,” as used in Bell, refers to the 
punishment of a pretrial detainee for his alleged criminal 
conduct, committed prior to his detention, for which he has 
not yet been convicted.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-36.  The 
Supreme Court explained that this type of “punishment” is 
prohibited by the Due Process Clause because the detainee 
“ha[d] not been adjudged guilty of any crime” and “had only 
a ‘judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to 
[the] extended restraint of [his] liberty following arrest.’”  Id. 
at 536-37 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 
(1975)).  Bell did not concern the type of “punishment” or 
discipline alleged in this case: punishment of a detainee for 
his in-facility conduct that might violate the facility’s rules 
and policies.  Despite the apparent distinctions between Bell 
and cases where a detainee claims that he was “punished” for 
his in-facility conduct, we agree with the First Circuit’s 
determination in Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons that 
the “theoretical constitutional premises of Bell’s analysis 
provides some rational guidance” for evaluating claims 
involving in-facility conduct that could  
warrant disciplinary action.11  51 F.3d 315, 317-18 (1st Cir. 
1995).   
                                              
11 The First Circuit explained in Collazo-Leon, 
[o]n the authority of Bell, it may 
be divined that even if a 
restriction or condition may be 
viewed as having a punitive effect 
on the pretrial detainee, it is 
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 With that understanding, we turn to the question of 
whether Defendants had a “legitimate governmental 
objective” in transferring Steele to administrative segregation 
in this case.  Steele argues that his segregation did not serve 
any rational purpose other than punishment.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Steele, as we must, we 
cannot agree that Steele has presented evidence sufficient to 
create a genuine dispute of material fact on this issue.  The 
record shows that Steele was placed into administrative 
segregation for internal security reasons. 
 
  The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that 
maintaining internal security and order in jails and prisons are 
“legitimate governmental objectives” and that courts must 
give prison officials considerable discretion to manage 
                                                                                                     
nonetheless constitutional if it 
also furthers  
some legitimate governmental 
objective such as addressing a 
specific institutional violation and 
is not excessive in light of the 
seriousness of the violation. . . . If 
there is a reasonable relation 
between the sanctions and 
legitimate institutional policies, an 
intent to punish the detainee for 
prior unproven criminal conduct 
cannot be inferred.  
 
51 F.3d at 318. 
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internal security in their institutions.  See, e.g., Sandin v. 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995) (“[F]ederal courts 
ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state 
officials trying to manage a volatile environment.”); Hewitt v. 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983) (“Prison administrators . . . 
should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption 
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment 
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to 
maintain institutional security.” (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 
547)), receded from on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 
482-83; Bell, 441 U.S. at 561 (“Ensuring security and order at 
the institution is a permissible non-punitive objective, 
whether the facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted 
inmates, or both.”).  Courts must afford such deference 
because “assessing the seriousness of a threat” requires 
officials to do more than simply take stock of the “specific 
facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must 
consider the character of the inmates confined in the 
institution, recent and longstanding relations between 
prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like.”  
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474.  
  
 Of course, officials’ discretion is not unbridled.  They 
cannot insulate themselves from liability under the Due 
Process Clause by mechanically citing to broad internal 
security interests, regardless of how insignificant or unlikely 
to occur a particular threat might be.  But the record before us 
suggests that the threat posed to internal security by Steele’s 
conduct was legitimate and ongoing.  MCACC officials had 
evidence that Steele was conducting an illegal bail bonds 
scheme with Speedy over the phone.  They also believed that 
Steele’s actions endangered other detainees in the facility 
because Steele was threatening to disclose detainees’ charges 
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to the general MCACC population if those detainees did not 
use Speedy’s service.12  So Steele “was placed in 
administrative segregation . . . to prevent him from posing 
any additional security risks in the facility,” and to allow for 
continued investigation, without Steele’s interference.  App. 
1313.   
 
 Steele appears to argue further that even if mitigating 
against security risks was the legitimate, non-punitive 
purpose behind Defendants’ actions, placement in 
administrative segregation was “excessive” in light of this 
purpose.  Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 67-68.  Steele posits that, 
instead of transferring him to administrative segregation, 
MCACC officials “could simply have monitored [him] more 
closely, or further limited his movements and communication 
opportunities with other prisoners.”  Suppl. Br. of Appellant 
3.   But the Due Process Clause does not mandate that 
MCACC officials use the least restrictive means available to 
accomplish their non-punitive objective.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 
542 n.25, 561; see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 
590 n.10, 591 n.11 (1984) (noting that “administrative 
officials are not obliged to adopt the least restrictive means to 
meet their legitimate objectives”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
was careful to explain in Bell that “[g]overnmental action 
does not have to be the only alternative or even the best 
                                              
 12 According to the complaint submitted about Steele’s 
conduct, Steele had specifically threatened to disclose one 
detainee’s child sex offense charges.  As Sergeant De Amicis 
pointed out in his affidavit, “[c]hild sex offenders are among 
the most hated members of the inmate population,” so 
concerns for that detainee’s safety were “justifiabl[e].”  App. 
1311. 
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alternative for it to be reasonable, to say nothing of 
constitutional.”  Bell, 441 U.S. at 542 n.25; see also Proctor 
v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2017) (stating that the 
Supreme Court made clear in Hewitt that administrative 
segregation “is appropriate when necessary to incapacitate an 
inmate who ‘represents a security threat’ or to ‘complet[e] . . . 
an investigation into misconduct charges’” (quoting Hewitt, 
459 U.S. at 476)).  
      
 Steele’s transfer to administrative segregation was not 
an excessive response by MCACC officials to legitimate 
internal security concerns.  As discussed, MCACC officials 
believed that Steele’s alleged bail bonds scheme posed a risk 
to other detainees because they had received information that 
Steele threatened to disclose a detainee’s sex offense charges 
to the general population as part of the scheme.  In light of 
these security concerns, it was a non-excessive response for 
MCACC officials to temporarily remove Steele from the 
general population, where he would be in a position to make 
such threats to other detainees, while they investigated his 
conduct.13   
 
 In sum, Steele has not met his “heavy burden of 
showing that [Defendants] have exaggerated their response to 
the genuine security considerations that actuated” his move to 
more restrictive conditions.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 561-62.  
Therefore, we conclude that Steele’s transfer to 
                                              
 
13 To the extent Steele argues separately that the 
restriction of his phone privileges constituted prohibited 
“punishment” under Bell, we disagree, given that Steele 
admitted to contact with Speedy over the phone. 
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administrative segregation did not violate his substantive due 
process rights under Bell.14 
 
B.  Procedural Due Process 
 In addition to his substantive due process claims, 
Steele asserts that Defendants denied his procedural due 
process rights when they transferred him to administrative 
segregation.  To maintain a procedural due process claim, 
Steele must show that: (1) Defendants deprived him of an 
individual liberty interest that is encompassed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection, and (2) the procedures 
Defendants made available to him did not provide due 
process of law.  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 
233-34 (3d Cir. 2006).  The liberty rights protected by 
procedural due process are broader than those protected by 
substantive due process; they “may arise from the 
Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the 
word ‘liberty,’” or they “may arise from an expectation or 
interest created by state laws or policies.”  Wilkinson v. 
                                              
 14 Steele also argues that the District Court failed to 
consider his pro se “letter brief” as an affidavit in opposition 
to Defendants’ summary judgment motion.  Having 
considered the letter brief for purposes of this appeal, we 
conclude that, without more, Steele’s conclusory statement 
that “defendants used the Administrative Segregation as a 
punishment because [Steele] did not want to agree with the 
defendants to lie on Speedy bail bonds” is not sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
purpose for Steele’s transfer and to overcome summary 
judgment as to Steele’s substantive due process claims.  
Suppl. Br. of Appellant 5. 
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Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); see also Layton v. Beyer, 
953 F.2d 839, 845 (3d Cir. 1992).  Interests in the latter 
category are often referred to as “state-created” liberty 
interests.   
 
 Assuming without deciding that Steele’s claimed 
liberty interests are protected, we agree with the District 
Court that Steele has not shown a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Defendants provided due process of law.  
The Supreme Court has explained that when an individual is 
transferred to administrative segregation because he is “feared 
to be a threat to institutional security,” detention officials 
must provide only 
 
an informal, nonadversary 
evidentiary review . . . for the 
decision that an inmate represents 
a security threat and the decision 
to confine an inmate to 
administrative segregation 
pending completion of an 
investigation into misconduct 
charges against him. An inmate 
must merely receive some notice 
of the charges against him and an 
opportunity to present his views 
to the prison official charged with 
deciding whether to transfer him 
to administrative segregation. . . . 
So long as this occurs, and the 
decisionmaker reviews the 
charges and then-available 
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evidence against the prisoner, the 
Due Process Clause is satisfied. 
 
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474, 476; see also Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 
70 (citing Hewitt).  This informal review must take place 
“within a reasonable time following an inmate’s transfer.”  
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476 n.8. 
 
 Steele does not argue that he received insufficient 
process under Hewitt.  Indeed, he appears to acknowledge 
that he received notice of the allegations against him in an 
interview with prison officials that took place prior to his 
transfer.  Steele himself testified that he was informed during 
the February 25, 2009, meeting that MCACC officials had 
received a complaint about him “making money for the bail 
bondsmen” and “threatening inmates” to “try[] to get money 
out of them.”  App. 1303.   Steele was clear in his deposition 
that he understood the nature of the allegations against him, 
explaining that in “[t]he first meeting I’m getting the 
information.  Now I know what’s going on.  Now I know that 
they are saying that, okay, we think that you’re getting paid 
for every bail that you bring to them. . . . We think that you’re 
doing this wrong.  We think you’re doing this illegal.”  App. 
1305.  Steele admitted during the February 25th meeting that 
he had arranged bail bonds with Speedy for other inmates, but 
claimed he was arranging the bonds “out of the goodness of 
[his] heart.”  App. 1305.  There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that Steele sought and was denied the opportunity to 
present any additional facts or evidence in support of his 
position.  And while MCACC officials may not have believed 
Steele’s explanation for his conduct, there is no evidence in 
the record to suggest that they failed to consider his 
explanation. 
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 The focus of Steele’s procedural due process challenge 
circles back to Defendants’ asserted reasons for transferring 
Steele to administrative segregation.  He argues that he was 
transferred for disciplinary reasons, and, therefore, due 
process protections required MCACC officials to provide him 
with a written statement of the evidence and charges against 
him, which he did not receive.  See Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70-
71.  For the reasons already noted, however, we agree with 
the District Court that the summary judgment record in this 
case shows that Steele’s transfer was for institutional security 
reasons rather than for discipline or punishment.  Steele was 
administratively separated from the general MCACC 
population pending further investigation into his conduct and 
Speedy’s activities within the MCACC.  Therefore, he was 
due the level of process outlined in Hewitt.15 
                                              
 15 Steele also argues, in a single paragraph, that the 
absence of a specific notice informing him that his telephone 
privileges would be restricted in administrative segregation 
violates the Due Process Clause.  We cannot agree that 
MCACC officials were required to explain in their interview 
with Steele all of the attendant restrictions of his 
administrative segregation.  The key inquiry was whether he 
received notice of the charges against him and had an 
opportunity to respond.  Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476; see also 
Artway v. Att’y Gen. of State of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1252 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (“Due Process requires ‘notice reasonably 
calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.’” (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))); Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 
F.3d 188, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that “the effect of 
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 Steele also contends throughout his briefing that 
Defendants violated the Due Process Clause by failing to 
follow the procedures outlined in the Manual.  Even if we 
were to find that the parties’ actions implicated certain 
procedures set forth in the Manual, there is no standalone 
protected liberty interest in those procedures.  See Rodriguez 
v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 339 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that a state statute “that merely establishes procedural 
requirements does not thereby create a liberty interest, 
because an expectation of receiving process is not, without 
more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Supreme Court has 
explained that  
 
[p]rocess is not an end in itself.  
Its constitutional purpose is to 
protect a substantive interest to 
which the individual has a 
legitimate claim of entitlement. . . 
. The State may choose to require 
procedures for reasons other than 
protection against deprivation of 
substantive rights, of course, but 
in making that choice the State 
does not create an independent 
                                                                                                     
the notice should be to compel the charging officer to be 
[sufficiently] specific as to the misconduct with which the 
inmate is charged to inform the inmate of what he is accused 
of doing so that he can prepare a defense to those charges and 
not be made to explain away vague charges.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  As discussed, there is no dispute 
that Steele received such notice here. 
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substantive right. 
 
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983).  In other 
words, a valid due process claim will not automatically 
follow from Defendants’ failure to abide by the Manual’s 
procedural requirements.   
  
 Further, where a plaintiff establishes a state-created 
liberty interest, a court must determine the level of process 
due by drawing from federal constitutional law, not from state 
laws, regulations, or policies.  Layton, 953 F.2d at 851-52 
(holding that while consideration of state regulations “may be 
relevant in determining” what process is due, “they clearly do 
not, in and of themselves, define or control the requirements 
of the Constitution”); see also Cleveland Bd. of Edu. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (explaining that “once 
it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, . . . [t]he 
answer to th[e] question [of what process is due] is not to be 
found in the [state] statute”).  So here, the MCACC Manual 
does not dictate what level of process will pass constitutional 
muster.  Accordingly, this argument fails. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to all Defendants on Steele’s substantive 
and procedural due process claims will be affirmed. 
 
